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1Abstract
At least since Arrow (1962), the eﬀects of appropriability on invention have
been well studied, but there has been little analysis of the eﬀect of appropriability
on the commercialization of existing inventions. Exploiting a database of 805
attempts by private ﬁrms to commercialize inventions licensed from MIT between
1980 and 1996, we explore the inﬂuence of several appropriability mechanisms on
the commercialization and termination of projects to develop products based on
university inventions. We construct a theoretical model in which the licensee faces
technical and market uncertainty, and anticipates that its products will be imitated.
We characterize the hazards of commercialization and termination as functions of
appropriability mechanisms, including patent scope and the eﬀectiveness of patents
as well as learning, lead time, and secrecy in attaining competitive advantage. The
model is tested using a competing risks framework that allows for non-parametric
unobserved heterogeneity and correlated risks. In our sample, patent strength and
secrecy inﬂuence termination decisions, while learning, patent scope and lead time
inﬂuence commercialization decisions.
Keywords: Hazard rates, Innovation, Optimal stopping problem, Patent scope, Uni-
versity licensing, Termination
JEL numbers: O31, O34
21 Introduction
Do strong intellectual property rights enhance the commercialization of new technology?
Surprisingly, we do not know the answer to this question (Gallini 2002). Although the
role of property rights in innovation has been studied extensively since Arrow (1962) ar-
gued that ﬁrms underinvest in R&D because they cannot fully appropriate the returns,
much of this work focuses on the eﬀect of property rights, particularly those associated
with patents, on inventive activity. There has been little analysis of the eﬀect of ap-
propriability mechanisms on the commercialization of existing inventions (Hahn 2003).
As ﬁrms increasingly rely on externally generated inventions, particularly those invented
and patented by universities, this omission represents an important gap in our under-
standing (Santoro and Chakrabarti 2002, Thursby and Thursby 2003). Furthermore,
given the strong evidence that intellectual property rights are imperfect in their ability
to deter imitation, it is important for managers in-licensing inventions to understand the
role of a broad range of mechanisms to appropriate the returns to commercializing these
inventions.
In this paper, we exploit a unique database that allows us to examine the relationship
between appropriability mechanisms and the outcomes of commercialization eﬀorts in the
context of university patent licensing. We examine the population of 805 attempts by
private ﬁrms to commercialize patentable inventions licensed from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology between 1980 and 1996. We use information obtained from the
MIT Technology Licensing Oﬃce (TLO) on whether the invention was commercialized,
and if so, the date of ﬁrst sale, and the date of termination if the license was terminated.
We augment this information with data on patent scope, measures of patent eﬀectiveness
and other means of appropriating returns to innovation, such as secrecy, learning, and
lead time.
To derive hypotheses for the empirical analysis, we construct a theoretical model
of the decisions faced by a ﬁrm that has exclusively licensed a patentable university
invention.1 Reﬂecting the embryonic nature of most university inventions, we assume
1The theoretical literature on optimal R&D investment and the diﬀusion of innovation is vast. A
number of papers deal with questions closely related to the topic of this paper, such as the optimal
amount of R&D investment under potential competition in the product market (Kamien and Schwartz,
1971 and 1974), the optimal timing of innovation with strategic interactions between ﬁrms (for instance,
Reinganum, 1980 and 1981; Katz and Shapiro, 1987; Waterson, 1990 and more recently, Jensen, 2003
and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube, 2005, which also provides a short survey of this literature) or in
3that further development is needed before a product based on the invention can be
commercialized. A key ingredient of the model is that the returns to this development
are subject to both technical and market uncertainty (Thursby and Thursby 2002, Shane
2000). The ﬁrm also anticipates entry by other ﬁrms with products based on non-
infringing substitutes for the invention. Thus, despite patent protection, the ﬁrm knows
that it is unlikely to obtain monopoly proﬁts throughout the life of the patent. The
window during which the ﬁrm earns monopoly proﬁts, or lead time, depends on the cost
of non-infringing imitation. The importance of lead time to the ﬁrm is a function of the
diﬀerence between these monopoly proﬁts and duopoly proﬁts once a competitor enters.
Following Mansﬁeld et al.’s (1981) study, we view the competitor’s imitation costs as
being positively related to the level of protection oﬀered by the patent (patent strength),
its scope, and the eﬀectiveness of secrecy.
In our model, in each period, the ﬁrm decides whether to invest in further development
of the invention, increasing the technical probability of success, or to terminate the
project. Contingent on technical success, the ﬁrm decides when to commercialize the
invention. The model is constructed to characterize the hazard of the ﬁrm terminating
development in any period, as well as the hazard of commercializing in any period. The
existence of technical and market uncertainty, reﬂected by shocks to development cost
and proﬁt shocks respectively, allows us to express both the hazards of termination and
commercialization as functions, not only of time, but also the ﬁrm’s ability to appropriate
the returns from developing a marketable product based on the invention.
Since higher imitation costs result in delayed entry by a competitor and, therefore,
higher expected returns from the licensed innovation, it is not surprising that we ﬁnd the
hazard of the ﬁrm terminating a license to be decreasing in the date of entry by a com-
petitor. Better appropriability (in the sense of wider patent scope, more eﬀective patent
strength and more eﬀective secrecy) therefore results in a lower hazard of termination
because of its negative eﬀect on the speed at which imitators can catch up.
The relationship between commercialization and various measures of appropriability
is less straightforward, since the ﬁrm may or may not commercialize the invention as
soon as technical success is determined. As is well known from the product development
literature, ﬁrms may introduce products quickly to take advantage of a market opportu-
a decision-theoretic framework (for instance, Kamien and Schwartz, 1972; Jensen, 1982 and recently,
Takalo and Kanniainen, 2000). Our model borrows substantially from the modeling choices made by
several of these authors.
4nity or delay because realized proﬁt early on may be low (see Lilien and Yoon, 1990 and
Bayus et al., 1997). When taking potential imitation into account, and under the as-
sumption that commercialization discloses important information about the technology
to potential competitors, the ﬁrm must weigh realized current proﬁt with the potential
for imitation. In our model, we show that waiting is optimal when the realized proﬁt in
the period of technical success is below a threshold that we characterize, even though
the ﬁrm never expects that it will delay commercialization. This outcome is more likely
to happen when the ability to appropriate returns is low.
We ﬁnd the hazard of commercialization to be positively related to appropriability
mechanisms that raise imitation costs. This is because, other things being held constant,
the longer the ﬁrm anticipates earning monopoly proﬁts, the more readily it tolerates a
low proﬁt level initially. Thus, in this case, a wide range of initial proﬁt realizations are
consistent with the ﬁrm’s decision to commercialize immediately rather than to wait. A
similar result holds regarding the role of learning in appropriating returns. The more
important learning is, the less the diﬀerence between monopoly and duopoly proﬁt to the
licensee, but also the lower the proﬁt to a competitor and, thus, the later the date of entry.
These eﬀects imply that when learning is important, the hazard of commercialization is
higher.
On the other hand, the hazard of commercialization is decreasing in the importance
of lead time in appropriating returns. The lead time before imitation contributes more
to the ﬁrm’s overall return from commercialization the larger is the diﬀerence between
monopoly and duopoly proﬁts in each period. Thus, for inventions that yield a relatively
low return once imitated, the threshold above which commercialization occurs is higher.
In this situation, lead time is relatively important in appropriating returns, and the range
of acceptable initial monopoly proﬁt realizations for commercialization is smaller, ceteris
paribus.
The empirical analysis is based on a competing risks hazard model which allows
correlated risks and unobserved heterogeneity. The empirical results support most of
the model’s predictions for both termination and commercialization. The hazard of
termination is decreasing in secrecy and patent strength, and this ﬁnding is robust across
speciﬁcations. An increase patent scope has a negative eﬀect on termination, though this
eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant.
With respect to commercialization, the hazard rate is increasing in patent scope and
the importance of learning, as predicted by the model. Further, we ﬁnd robust support
5for our novel theoretical result that the hazard of commercialization is decreasing in the
importance of lead time. Finally, although positive, the relationships between patent
strength and secrecy and the hazard of commercialization are not statistically signiﬁcant.
By showing, both theoretically and empirically, that several dimensions of appropri-
ability aﬀect the hazards of project termination and technology commercialization, we
contribute to the literature on appropriability and innovation. Our results on patent
strength contribute to the extensive literature on patents and innovation (for a survey,
see Gallini, 2002). By treating the decision to commercialize an invention as an optimal
stopping problem with technical uncertainty, we examine patent scope and innovation
in a way that incorporates the possibility of termination, which, though quite relevant
to embryonic technologies licensed to ﬁrms, has been ignored in the literature.2 Fur-
thermore, we contribute to the empirical literature on the eﬀectiveness of patents in
appropriating the returns from R&D by directly examining the relationship between
patent characteristics and the development of products based on newly invented tech-
nologies, rather than relying on perceptions of R&D personnel responding to surveys
(Taylor and Silberston, 1973; Mansﬁeld, 1986; and Mansﬁeld et al, 1981). Finally, by
focusing on the diﬀerence between monopoly and duopoly proﬁts as a measure of the
importance of lead time, we are able to derive, and test empirically, the nontrivial result
that the hazard of commercialization is decreasing in the importance of lead time.
Our theoretical analysis also extends the literature on product development and man-
agement. For example, Lilien and Yoon (1990) and Bayus et al. (1997) show that it may
be optimal for market pioneers to delay product launch depending on demand charac-
teristics, as well as market competition. Our model provides a rationale for the timing of
2We assume discrete time to be able to explicitly characterize hazard rates of termination and com-
mercialization and perform comparative statics on several measures of appropriability. Solutions to
general optimal stopping problems have been characterized by Roberts and Weitzman (1980). See Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) for a discussion of the complexity involved in characterizing the distribution of the
optimal stopping time in continuous time models with uncertainty, and thus, the hazard rate of the
stopping decision. See also Marco (2003) for an application somewhat related to our paper in which
comparative statics rely on simulations. Kamien and Schwartz (1971), Grossman and Shapiro (1986)
and Goel (1996) among others have analyzed the problem of a ﬁrm with the opportunity to invest in a
R&D project of unknown diﬃculty, so that in their models, terminating the project is an option for the
ﬁrm. However, they also assume that the reward is known so that the decision to commercialize once
successful is trivial. Our model is similar to Takalo and Kanniainen (2000) since we treat the decision to
commercialize as an optimal stopping problem, but we diﬀer substantially in that our problem includes
technical uncertainty so that termination is a realistic option for the ﬁrm.
6product launch in the context of appropriabilty mechanisms. In this regard, our analysis
adds to the literature on commercialization strategy as well. For example, Gans, Hsu
and Stern (2003) examine whether startup innovative ﬁrms commercialize their inno-
vations independently or by partnering with other ﬁrms as a function of patent rights,
secrecy, or the litigation environment as measures of the appropriability regime. Both
our theoretical and empirical results add to this literature by considering other measures
of appropriability and the timing of independent commercialization.
Finally, we contribute to the practice of technology management and strategy by
developing and then testing a model of how managers should make decisions about
investing in the development of inventions or terminating R&D projects as a function
of the ways that the returns to that investment can be appropriated. We explain and
show that managers should think diﬀerently about appropriability conditions in making
project termination and technology commercialization decisions because appropriability
conditions aﬀect the two types of decisions in very diﬀerent ways. Moreover, our model
and our empirical test both indicate when managers should delay commercialization as
a way to enhance returns. Given the increasing reliance of ﬁrms on externally-generated
inventions, particularly those developed in universities, this information should be useful
to managers in technology-intensive industries.
In section 2 we describe the model and derive the comparative statics results on
appropriability measures. In sections 3 through 5, we present the data and empirical
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
In this section, we consider the problem faced by a ﬁrm (henceforth, “the licensee”) that
has exclusively licensed a patented university invention which requires further develop-
ment before it can be commercialized. The returns to the licensee are subject to technical
as well as market uncertainty. By technical uncertainty, we refer to the likelihood that
the invention works. The existence of such uncertainty is supported by a recent survey
of businesses that license-in university inventions in which respondents reported that
47% of the licensed inventions that failed did so for purely technical reasons (Thursby
and Thursby, 2003). This is hardly surprising since roughly half of university inventions
licensed are no more than a proof of concept at the time of license (Jensen and Thursby,
2001, and Thursby et al., 2001).
7Market uncertainty exists for several reasons. First, deﬁning market opportunities for
early stage inventions is diﬃcult, so much so that many university inventions end up with
applications that are not anticipated at the time of license (Shane, 2000, and Thursby
and Thursby, 2002). Second, even though the exclusive patent license guarantees a legal
monopoly on market applications of the invention, it provides no guarantee against other
ﬁrms developing substitutes or inventing around the patent.
2.1 Optimal development and commercialization
To successfully commercialize the invention, the licensee must invest Ct = c + ˜ ǫt per
period, where the random cost shock ˜ ǫt is i.i.d. according to a continuously diﬀerentiable
c.d.f. G(˜ ǫ) with zero mean and deﬁned on a non-empty interval [ǫ,ǫ].3 The running
development cost c includes not only internal costs but also payments to the univer-
sity, such as milestones, minimum royalties, and sponsored research. The probability of
technical success in period t is qt. While investment may not increase the probability
of success in any period, it is natural to assume that the sequence of probabilities qt is
non-decreasing.4
We assume the life of the patent on the licensed technology is L > 1. As in Takalo and
Kanniainen (2000), the licensee faces exogenous market uncertainty as well as potential
competition from a follower selling a non-infringing substitute. When the licensee has
a monopoly in the market for its product, its proﬁt in period t, denoted by ˜ πm
t , is a
random variable with c.d.f. F m
t (˜ πm
t ). If the licensee faces competition in period t, then
its proﬁt is given by the random variable ˜ πd
t with c.d.f. F d
t (˜ πd
t). Importantly, we assume
πm
t ≡ E[˜ πm
t ] > E[˜ πd
t] ≡ πd
t, as well as πd
t ≥ 0, that is, expected monopoly proﬁt is strictly
greater than expected duopoly proﬁt and both are positive. Finally, for interest rate r,
δ = (1 + r)−1 < 1 is the licensee’s discount rate.
The timing of events in a given period is as follows. The licensee observes the real-
ization of the cost shock, ǫt, and must decide whether to invest c+ǫt or to terminate. If
the licensee invests, but this investment yields a technical failure, the licensee observes a
new cost shock and again, decides whether to invest or to terminate. If investment yields
3In the continuation, we assume ǫ > −c.
4Thus we assume qt is the true probability of success. An alternative, and more complicated model,
would allow the licensee’s perceived probability of success to diﬀer from the true probability. In that
case, investment could yield positive or negative observations which would be used to update the ﬁrm’s
perceived (prior) probability according to Bayes Rule.
8a technical success, the licensee observes the realization of proﬁt for the current period
and must decide whether to commercialize or to wait. If it decided to wait in period t,
then it observes the proﬁt realization for the next period, when again, it decides whether
to commercialize or to wait.
We begin by analyzing the decision to terminate or continue to work on the project
prior to technical success. To this eﬀect, let Vt denote the expected value from commer-
cializing optimally given that technical success was achieved in period t. At this point,
it is useful to make the following intuitive assumption in order to characterize the value
of continuing to invest, Vc(ǫt,t). We maintain this assumption throughout the remainder
of the analysis.
Assumption 1. There exists a period of time L such that for t ≤ L, there is non-
zero probability that the value of continuing to invest will be strictly positive and for
t > L, the value of continuing to invest is equal to zero with probability one. That is,
qLVL ≥ c + ǫ and for all t > L, qtVt < c + ǫ.
Under Assumption 1, a standard dynamic programming argument implies that given

















The value of continuing to invest given by equation (1) has a straightforward in-
terpretation. After subtracting the cost of development at period t, it is equal to the
probability of being successful in period t times the value of commercializing optimally
thereafter, plus the expected value of being successful in a later period minus the ex-
pected development cost.
To determine the conditions under which the licensee terminates development, we
deﬁne
∆t ≡ −c + qtVt + (1 − qt)δEVc(˜ ǫt+1,t + 1). (2)
If ǫt > ∆t, the licensee terminates in period t, whereas if ǫt ≤ ∆t, it continues; that
is, the licensee continues as long as the expected value of doing so is greater than the
random cost shock.
9We now characterize Vt by considering the licensee’s optimal commercialization de-
cision problem. The date at which a rival may enter and commercialize a product based
on a non-infringing technology is endogenous to the extent that an entrant can reverse
engineer and invent around the licensed technology. If the licensee ﬁrst commercializes
at t ≤ L, we assume it correctly determines that successful imitation by an entrant will
take place in period λt.5 Hence λt − t represents the licensee’s lead time, or the time
window during which the licensee receives monopoly proﬁt from selling the invention, if
it commercializes in period t. We assume that L + 1 > λt > t holds. In other words,
imitation occurs strictly after the date of ﬁrst sale and no later than the period following
the patent’s expiration date. We also assume that λt does not decrease with t. Implic-
itly we are assuming that dissemination of information required for successful imitation
occurs through the commercialization of a product by the licensee (Takalo and Kanni-
ainen, 2000). The follower’s entry time is clearly a function of other variables besides
the licensee’s ﬁrst date of sale t. It will generally depend on any factor related to how
diﬃcult non-infringing imitation is, such as the cost of development of such imitation
and the expected proﬁt from marketing it. We note that the realistic assumption that
the licensee cannot perfectly forecast proﬁt levels allows us to generate a rich set of im-
plications regarding commercialization. Indeed, in the absence of market uncertainty,
the decision to commercialize would be trivial. If the certain cumulative proﬁt decreased
over time, then the licensee would commercialize immediately following technical suc-
cess. Otherwise the ﬁrm would simply wait until the date at which cumulative proﬁt
was the highest. The probability that the ﬁrm would commercialize at that date would
thus equal one, while it would be zero in other periods.
Under these assumptions, in the period in which the ﬁrst sale occurs, the licensee
acts as a monopolist, so that random proﬁt in that period is given by ˜ πm
t . It follows that
5We thus make the simplifying assumption that the date of entry by a competitor is known. It is
not clear that a model that treats the date of entry as uncertain would generate more insight so long as
the key elements of our basic model, such as the fact that duopoly proﬁt is lower than monopoly proﬁt,
are present. For instance, such a model may be set up by assuming that the entry date is a random
variable and that λt is the earliest date at which a competitor can potentially catch up (that is, the
lower bound of the support of a distribution of entry dates from the point of view of the licensee). We
conjecture that our main results would continue to hold in this model, since the licensee’s incentives to
terminate or commercialize in a given period are guided by similar tradeoﬀs in both models.
10cumulative proﬁt at date t ≤ L is given by















Denote the expected value of ˜ Πt by Πt, that is E[˜ Πt] = Πt. To simplify the characteri-
zation of the optimal commercialization rule, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. In every period t before the patent expires, the expected value from
beginning to sell in period t is greater than the expected value from delaying commer-
cialization to a later period.6
It is important to note that this assumption does not rule out the ﬁrm delaying com-
mercialization for one period if realized proﬁt turns out to be low in period t. Assumption
2 holds trivially if the proﬁt distributions are constant over time and lead time, λt−t, is
equal to a constant, representing a situation in which a certain and ﬁxed amount of time
is required before competitors can catch up with the innovator in the product market.
This would be the case, for instance, if the uncertainty was caused by i.i.d. transitory
shocks to either demand or production costs.
We now characterize the optimal decision rule for the general case. Suppose the
licensee was successful in or before period t ≤ L, but has not sold yet by date t. Under
Assumption 2, it is straightforward to show that the licensee’s optimal decision is to sell
in period t if and only if
˜ Πt ≥ Πt+1. (3)
The above decision rule implies that if the entry time is independent of the licensee’s
date of ﬁrst sale, that is λt+1 = λt, the licensee will sell in period t if and only if monopoly
proﬁt is non-negative in that period. More interestingly, straightforward calculations















Equation (4) has an intuitive interpretation. The optimal commercialization decision is
guided by a tradeoﬀ between selling for one more period and delaying commercialization
6The results would continue to hold if Assumption 2 were relaxed, although the exposition would be
lengthier.
11and thus, imitation. Selling in period t will generate proﬁt equal to ˜ πm
t in the period
of ﬁrst sale, while the discounted net beneﬁt from delaying is represented by Γt.7 The
cutoﬀ value for proﬁt given by Γt depends on three crucial factors. One is λt − t, the
licensee’s lead time if the invention is commercialized in period t. The second factor
is λt+1 − λt, the amount of time by which the follower’s entry will be pushed back if
the licensee delays commercialization for one period. The third factor is the diﬀerence
between expected monopoly and duopoly proﬁt, πm
λt+s − πd
λt+s.8
Through its eﬀect on the cost of imitation, the eﬀectiveness of appropriability mech-
anisms used by the licensee will clearly aﬀect the entry dates, λt and λt+1, and thus,
the critical value for the net beneﬁt from delaying. However, even with the intuitive
assumption that more eﬀective appropriability mechanisms lead to later entry and thus,
higher values for λt and λt+1, in general, the relationship between the threshold in (4) and
appropriability mechanisms is ambiguous and somewhat diﬃcult to characterize. In the
Appendix, we outline a model of the follower’s imitation decision in which a higher mar-
ginal cost of imitation results in a higher optimal value for λt, the follower’s entry date.
The relationship between the marginal cost of imitation and a change in the diﬀerence
λt+1 − λt is ambiguous because of its strong dependence on the sequence of per-period
proﬁt the follower expects to receive from λt on out. The sequence of per-period proﬁt
depends in turn on the stage of the product life cycle in which the licensee introduced
the new product.
2.2 Likelihood of termination and commercialization
To complete our characterization of the value of the project given by (1), note that when
Assumption 2 holds, Vt, the expected value from commercializing in period t before the
licensee learns the realization of ˜ πm
t , is simply equal to Πt.9 In other words, based on
expected proﬁt, the licensee would optimally commercialize immediately after technical
success. However, as we have shown, it may end up delaying if, actual, realized proﬁt in
period t turns out to be less than expected.
7Observe that Γt is strictly greater than zero whenever the following inequalities are satisﬁed: λt > t,
λt+1 > λt and πm
t > πd
t .
8With (4), our model provides a formal basis for Lilien and Yoon’s (1990) intuitive result stated in
their Proposition 4.
9The option value from making an optimal commercialization decision in period t is equal
to V (˜ πm
t ,t) = max{˜ Πt,EV (πm
t+1,t + 1)}. Hence, if Assumption 2 holds, Vt ≡ EV (˜ πm
t ,t) =
max{E˜ Πt,EV (πm
t+1,t + 1)} = Πt.
12Based on the above analysis, the hazard of termination in period t ≤ L, that is, the
probability of termination conditional on the licensee not having terminated or commer-
cialized prior to t, is given by Pr(˜ ǫt ≥ ∆t) or
Hd(t) = 1 − G(∆t).
By Assumption 1, for t > L, the hazard of termination is equal to one.
The hazard of commercialization in period t ≤ L, that is, the probability of commer-
cialization conditional on the licensee being successful before period t and it not having
terminated or commercialized prior to t, is equal to Pr(˜ πm
t ≥ Γt) or
Hf(t) = 1 − F
m
t (Γt).
To derive testable implications, we adopt the view that empirically available measures
of appropriability provide information about the extent to which the licensee is able to
obtain monopoly proﬁts from commercializing a product based on the innovation. We
also appeal to the constant lead time assumption under which Assumption 2 always
holds, and we continue to assume that if the follower does not enter before the patent
expires, it enters at the patent’s expiration date. With these assumptions, expected
values of proﬁt are constant and λt ≡ min{t + l∗,L}, where l∗ is a positive constant.10






and if λt = λt+1 = L, then
Γt = 0.
The propositions below are stated without proofs because the results follow from a simple
inspection of the expressions for ∆t and Γt. The ﬁrst proposition identiﬁes the eﬀect of
key parameters on the hazard of termination and the second proposition provides results
for the hazard of commercialization.11
10Strictly speaking, lead time is only a constant if the patent’s expiration date is far enough in the
future. For patents with a short remaining statutory life, lead time is given by L − t and is thus
decreasing with time.
11Note that the hazard of termination depends on the monopoly and duopoly proﬁt levels, while as
illustrated by equation (4), the hazard of commercialization depends on the diﬀerence between expected
monopoly and duopoly proﬁts. Intuitively, the decision to terminate is based on the expected value of
cumulative proﬁt from successful commercialization and thus, on the expected proﬁt levels in periods
of sales. On the other hand, the decision to commercialize is motivated in part by the possibility of
delaying sales to earn monopoly rather than duopoly proﬁt in some periods. Hence, it naturally depends
on the diﬀerence between these two expected proﬁt levels.
13Proposition 1 Suppose that both the monopoly and the duopoly proﬁt distributions are
constant and that λt ≡ min{t+l∗,L}. Then, other things equal, in every period for which
the expected value from continuing to invest is positive (t < L) and for which λt < λt+1
holds, the hazard of termination is decreasing in l∗, πm, πd, δ, and qt. If in period t,
λt = λt+1 = L, the hazard of termination does not depend on l∗. Moreover, for t ≥ L,
the hazard of termination is equal to one.
Similarly, the following results hold for the hazard of commercialization.
Proposition 2 Suppose that both the monopoly and the duopoly proﬁt distributions are
constant and that λt ≡ min{t + l∗,L}. Then, other things equal, in every period prior
to the patent’s expiration date (t < L) for which λt < λt+1 holds, the hazard of com-
mercialization is increasing in l∗ and δ and it is decreasing in πm − πd. Moreover, if in
period t, λt = λt+1 = L, then the hazard of commercialization does not depend on l∗, δ
or πm − πd.
These results provide testable implications regarding the relationship between the
hazards of termination and commercialization and variables that are directly aﬀected
by the licensee’s ability to appropriate the returns from the innovation (l∗, πm, πd and
πm − πd). Other variables such as δ and qt may not directly relate to appropriability,
but are reﬂective of speciﬁc characteristics of the ﬁrm and the licensed invention.
For patents with suﬃciently long remaining statutory lives, the time window during
which the licensee is able to appropriate most of the returns from the invention lasts l∗
periods. The size of this window is clearly determined by the diﬃculty of non-infringing
imitation. Following Mansﬁeld (1986), Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) and the simple model
outlined in the Appendix, a stronger and broader patent as well as increased secrecy
should intuitively result in an increased value for l∗.
Regarding speciﬁc ﬁrm characteristics, a large (and growing) number of ﬁrms that
license university inventions are start-ups. To the extent that start-ups have less valu-
able outside options than larger well-established ﬁrms, they may be more patient as
represented by a higher discount factor. Finally, it seems reasonable to expect that the
probability of technical success is higher for inventions that were directly funded by the
industry.
In the next section, we discuss the robustness of the results in Propositions 1 and 2
to relaxing the constant lead time assumption.
142.3 Relaxing the constant lead time assumption
Although similar results to those summarized in Proposition 1 also hold if we relax
the constant lead time assumption, a complete analysis of the eﬀect of relaxing this
assumption on the follower’s optimal entry date and the hazard of commercialization
is tedious. Nonetheless, a discussion is in order as relaxing the assumption allows us
to consider the role of expected proﬁt dynamics. Such eﬀects may be important if, for
instance, a learning curve exists for the licensee, in the sense that the longer it has been
in the market, the higher the duopoly proﬁt the licensee is able to command when faced
with competition (because of decreasing production costs or increasing product quality
over time). With this interpretation, in (4), the existence of a learning curve implies that
πd
λt+s increases as s increases. Of course, a larger share of industry proﬁt for the licensee
will lead to a smaller share for the imitating follower and thus, decreased incentives to
follow soon after the licensee’s date of ﬁrst sale. The existence of learning eﬀects will
thus lead to both later imitation (an increase in λt) and a smaller diﬀerence between
monopoly and duopoly proﬁt (a decrease in the summation term in the expression for
Γt). Since, holding λt+1 − λt constant, these two eﬀects result in a lower value for Γt,
they both contribute to an increased hazard of commercialization. Finally, any factors
that lead to a lower value for duopoly proﬁt, πd
λt+s, will, ceteris paribus, increase the
diﬀerence between monopoly and duopoly proﬁts. This, in turn, will make lead time more
important and reinforce the lower hazard of commercialization predicted by Proposition
2.
3 Empirical Method
The theory models the empirical reality in which attempts to commercialize patented
inventions are either successful (in which case we may or may not observe a ﬁrst sale)
or not (in which case the license may be terminated or the licensee may continue devel-
opment). The appropriate empirical speciﬁcation for testing this theory is a competing
risks model which adjusts for right censoring and the discrete nature of the data.12
Let Tf be the duration of a patent that is licensed until ﬁrst sale and Td be the
duration of a license until it is terminated. Deﬁne T = min(Tf,Td) and let df be an
indicator which equals 1 if a patent is commercialized (ﬁrst sale) from a license and 0
12For detailed descriptions of competing risks models see Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (1980) and Lan-
caster (1990).
15otherwise. Let dd be an indicator which equals 1 if a patent is terminated from a license
and 0 otherwise. Only (T,df,dd) are observed. Because df and dd are observed, exclusion
restrictions are not necessary to uncover the latent survival functions, S (kf,kd|x), if there
is suﬃcient variation in the vector of regressors x (Abbring and van den Berg 2000, Han
and Hausman, 1990). Since our data are discrete, we employ a grouped data approach
(Han and Hausman, 1990). Our model follows McCall (1996).
The probability of a patent being terminated from a license conditional on no events
occurring through period k − 1 is:
Pr(Td = k|X,T > k − 1) = 1 − exp(−θd exp(αdk + β
′
dx)), (5)
where x is a set of exogenous (possibly) time-varying regressors. Similarly,
Pr(Tf = k|X,T > k − 1) = 1 − exp(−θf exp(αfk + β
′
fx)), (6)
is the probability a ﬁrst sale associated with a patent occurs conditional on no events
occurring through period k − 1. Period subscripts on x are dropped for readability.
Because the theory does not provide us with guidance as to possible exclusion restrictions,
we assume that regressors x are identical in both equations.
















In what follows, let Θ = {θf,θd}. αwk are the baseline parameters and can be
interpreted as:
αwk = log





where hw(t) is the underlying baseline hazard function and w ∈ {f,d}. αdk and αfk are
the respective baseline hazards and are assumed to follow a 3rd order polynomial. A
3rd order polynomial is suﬃciently ﬂexible to approximate a baseline hazard function of
only ﬁve periods. Thus
αwk = α0k + α1kk + α2kk
2 + α3kk
3. (8)
The vectors of parameters βw represent the eﬀects of the exogenous variables. Note
that all covariates are constant except patent age and year. Deﬁne
Pf(k) = S(k − 1,k − 1|Θ) − S(k,k − 1|Θ) − 0.5[S(k − 1,k − 1|Θ) + S(k,k|Θ)
16− S(k − 1,k|Θ) − S(k,k − 1)|Θ],
Pd(k) = S(k − 1,k − 1|Θ) − S(k − 1,k|Θ) − 0.5[S(k − 1,k − 1|Θ) + S(k,k|Θ)
− S(k − 1,k|Θ) − S(k,k − 1)|Θ],
Pc(k) = S(k − 1,k − 1|Θ),
where Pf(k) is the unconditional probability of ﬁrst sale by the beginning of period k,
Pd(k) is the unconditional probability of a patent being terminated from a license by
the beginning of period k, and Pc(k) is the unconditional probability of neither event
occurring through the beginning of period k. An adjustment, 0.5[S(k − 1,k − 1|Θ) +
S(k,k|Θ) − S(k − 1,k|Θ) − S(k,k − 1|Θ)] is made because durations are measured in
discrete time.
A key problem with competing risks models identiﬁed in the literature is that when
the risks are not allowed to correlate, a potential bias may arise. Unobserved determi-
nants of one event (ﬁrst sale) may be correlated with unobserved determinants of the
complementary event (termination) and duration (decision to do neither). We might
expect unobserved components, such as quality of the patent and uncertainty associated
with success of the technology, to aﬀect both decisions. In our speciﬁcation, we allow
risks to correlate by permitting a three mass-point distribution of location parameter
pairs θdj,θfj where j = 1,2,3. Each pair occurs with probability pj. The six location


























for each of the Kn periods of each of the N attempts.
To identify the model, the baseline hazards αf0 and αd0 are ﬁxed to zero. As there
is no constant in the regression, we use deviations from the means in x.
4 Data
The data used to test the model’s predictions were collected from the Technology Li-
censing Oﬃce (TLO) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on patents assigned
17to the Institute between 1980 and 1996 and licensed to private sector ﬁrms. The data
include all patented inventions by MIT faculty, staﬀ and students from 1980 through
1996 that were assigned to the Institute and licensed to at least one private ﬁrm.
Our data set is an unbalanced, right censored panel. We have yearly data for each
attempt from the date of the contractual agreement on the patent until one of the three
events occurs: it is right censored (in 1996), it is terminated or it is commercialized. An
observation begins the year that MIT TLO records indicate that a ﬁrm ﬁrst licensed a
patent. We code TERMINATION as zero, except in the year (if any) that MIT TLO
records indicate that the licensing agreement by the given ﬁrm no longer covered the
invention or if the patent expired, thereby negating the license. We code FIRSTSALE
as zero, except in the year (if any) that the MIT TLO records indicate that the ﬁrst
dollar of sales from a product or service embodying the invention was achieved.
There are 805 exclusive licenses corresponding to 2,875 periods in which licenses were
at risk. While it is plausible that licenses are terminated after commercialization, the
MIT TLO reports that this is a rare event, and hence this information was not collected.
That is, we only observe the ﬁrst event that occurs. The analysis below predicts the
likelihood of the ﬁrst event.13
Table 1 reports the summary statistics. Note that patent age reﬂects the mean age of
patents at the time of license. Table 2 reports the unconditional survival rates and the
extent of right censoring in the sample. First and foremost, ﬁrms are far more likely to
terminate licenses of patents than to successfully commercialize them (323 terminations
vs. 197 successes). The table also suggests that uncertainty associated with an innovation
is generally resolved in the ﬁrst 5 years of license because 85% of licenses either lead to
commercialization or are terminated by the end of period 5, and 90% of the observed
events occur in the ﬁrst ﬁve periods. (We observe only 2 events after period 10.) The
sparseness of this right tail implies that there is little information on which to estimate
a baseline hazard. Therefore, we recoded all observations that survived more than ﬁve
periods as right censored after ﬁve periods. The majority (257) are censored during the
ﬁrst four years of the license due to the closing of our observation window in 1996. In
addition to the observations that are right-censored after 1996, we censored an additional
74 observations.14
13Coding of commercialization was straightforward, as this is directly reported in the MIT data.
14There are three ways in which to interpret this censoring phenomenon. First, our model suggests
right censoring reﬂects unresolved uncertainty surrounding the invention’s commercial prospects. This
is our interpretation. Second, it is possible that we are simply missing data. We can rule out this
18As measures of importance of the appropriability mechanisms used in a line of busi-
ness, we employ four measures from the Yale survey on innovation: patent strength,
secrecy, lead time and learning (Levin et al., 1985; Levin et al., 1987). These measures
are survey line of business averages derived from perceptions of 650 high-level R&D
managers in 130 lines of business about central tendencies of the eﬀectiveness of diﬀer-
ent mechanisms used to appropriate the returns to innovation for process or product
R&D in their lines of business. The managers were asked to rate mechanisms on seven
point Likert scales.15 The items are constructed from responses to the following question
posed both for production processes and products: “In this line of business, how eﬀective
is each of the following means of capturing and protecting the competitive advantages
of new or improved products (production processes)”. Respondents answered on a seven
point Likert scale from “not at all eﬀective” to “very eﬀective”.
Patent strength is a measure of the eﬀectiveness of patents as a way to capture and
protect competitive advantage in a line of business. It is created from the average re-
sponse for production processes and products for two means of appropriability: “patents
to prevent competitors from duplicating the product (process)” and “patents to secure
royalty income”. Secrecy is a measure of the eﬀectiveness of keeping key information
secret as a way to capture and protect competitive advantage in a line of business. It
is created from the average response for production processes and products to “secrecy”
as a means of capturing and protecting the competitive advantages of new or improved
production processes (products). Lead time is a measure of the eﬀectiveness of being an
early mover as a way to capture and protect competitive advantage in a line of business.
It is created from the average response for production processes and products to “lead
possibility due to the nature of MIT’s record keeping, which is comprehensive given the ﬁnancial value
of those records. Third, it is possible that delays are cases in which licensees are “sitting” on the patent
as a mechanism to keep competitors from exploiting the technology. While we are unable to refute this
possibility out of hand, we view it as unlikely. Licensing contracts at MIT commonly give the Institute
march-in rights for this speciﬁc eventuality which can be triggered if there is no evidence of progress by
a licensee. Moreover, licensing fees are generally required on an annual basis. Thus, a ﬁrm incurs a real
cost if it chooses to sit on a patent.
15To ensure the reliability and validity of their survey, the scholars who conducted the Yale survey
pretested their survey with managers from diverse businesses. In addition, to mitigate intra-industry
heterogeneity, the respondents were asked to identify major innovations in their industry, and there was
not signiﬁcant variation in responses to this question within industries. Because of their reliability and
validity, the measures have been used in several subsequent studies (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Levin
et al., 1985).
19time (being ﬁrst with a new process [product])”. Learning is a measure of the eﬀec-
tiveness of moving ahead of competitors on the learning curve as a way to capture and
protect the competitive advantages in a line of business. It is created from the average
response for production processes and products to “moving quickly down the learning
curve”.
Because our sample covers the years 1980-1996, while the survey measures appropri-
ability conditions at a particular point in time, we must assume that the appropriability
diﬀerences between lines of business are relatively stable throughout our observation
period. There is some evidence that cross-industry diﬀerences in such factors in appro-
priability do not vary signiﬁcantly over time, as they are a function of the underlying
technology in a line of business (Cohen and Levin 1989). Although one might argue that
the relative strength of patents increased during the period, the intellectual property
protection aﬀorded by patents for, say, chemical compounds remains very strong relative
to that for electronic devices.
We also employ Lerner’s (1994) measure of PATENT SCOPE, which is based upon
the number of international patent classiﬁcations found on the patent. Lerner (1994)
ﬁnds that this measure is associated with various measures of economic importance:
ﬁrm valuation, likelihood of patent litigation, and citations. He argues that it represents
broader scope of the monopoly rights covered by the patents. In contrast to the Yale
measures, this variable is patent speciﬁc.16
The fact that we do not observe many licenses extending beyond 5 years without
a commercialization or termination event does not imply that uncertainty is resolved
within ﬁve years of issuance of a patent. It is common for licenses to survive well into
patent life before ﬁrst sale or termination (Table 3). The variation in patent age at the
time of license allows us to separately control for the eﬀects of the age of the license
and the age of the patent on the hazards of ﬁrst sale and termination. The former
are measured by the baseline hazard estimates, while the latter are measured by the
coeﬃcients on age. We measure AGE OF PATENT as the number of years since the
patent was issued, conditional on patent issue at time of license.
We also include TECHNOLOGY CLASS dummies. Following the Hall, Jaﬀe, and
16The writing of a patent can be part of a legal strategy as well as an administrative task. If,
for example, narrower patents were to issue more quickly, then ﬁrms would have an incentive not to
bargain over classiﬁcations with the patent examiner. Hence, the patent scope measure may, in some
circumstances, be endogenous to patent quality. While we know of little systematic research that
addresses this point, it suggests that we should interpret measurable eﬀects of this variable cautiously.
20Trajtenberg (2001) classiﬁcation of patents, we break the patents into ﬁve categories:
drugs, electronics (including computers and communications), chemicals, mechanical,
and other because we might expect diﬀerent types of technology to take longer to reach
ﬁrst sale, as is the case for drugs, which need to ﬁrst obtain FDA approval. 17 Un-
fortunately, we could not include ﬁner grade industry controls such as three-digit US
patent class dummies because the appropriability measures are associated with lines of
business, which are, in turn, mapped to the patents via their primary three-digit US
patent classes. Hence, there is no variation in the Yale appropriability measures within
three-digit patent classes.
For patent classes in which there are a suﬃciently high number of observations, we can
include patent class dummies. Our data span 108 patent classes, 86 of which perfectly
predict outcomes because they are represented in the data by one or two patents. We
estimate a variant of Model 4g, using 24 patent classes as controls and pooling the
remainder. The results of this regression (available upon request) were almost identical
to those that appear in Model 4g. Given the limits of our data, we were unable to estimate
a model that simultaneously accounted for unobserved heterogeneity and included these
patent class controls. Nevertheless, our results should be interpreted as reﬂecting an
association between appropriability conditions in line of business and termination and
commercialization hazards. To the extent that such an association might be associated
with other unobserved factors, our results must be qualiﬁed.
Finally, we also include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the patent was
licensed to a startup, deﬁned as a ﬁrm formed to license the particular technology.
(33% of the patents in our sample were licensed to startups). We also include a dummy
variable that indicates whether the research the led to the patented invention was funded
by industry. (16.8% of the patents were the result of industry funded research). Industry
funding does not, however, imply that the ﬁrm that funded the research necessarily was
the licensee. While research sponsors are not generally aﬀorded special licensing rights, in
practice we might expect them to be aware of research results earlier than non-sponsors.
(We are unable to identify cases in which sponsors licensed output of research they funded
because we do not observe the identity of the research sponsors).
17Reduced form hazard ratios suggest that event patterns in the various categories are distinct. For
example, licenses of drug patents tend to survive longer than other types of inventions. Unfortunately,
the data do not allow us to econometrically distinguish these diﬀerences.
215 Empirical Results
Our central results can be found in Table 4, Model a.18 The results control for un-
observed heterogeneity non-parametrically as per the method described above, for the
broad technology class (the omitted class is chemical patents), patent age and technology
vintage. In addition, we include dummies for whether the ﬁrm was a startup as well as
whether or not the research that led to the patent was sponsored by industry.19
Following our interpretation of PATENT STRENGTH, PATENT SCOPE and SE-
CRECY as increasing the cost and therefore the time to imitation, we expect each of
these variables to be negatively associated with the hazard of termination (Proposition
1). We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on PATENT STRENGTH and SECRECY are both
negative and signiﬁcant in the termination equation. The PATENT SCOPE coeﬃcient
point estimate is negative, although not signiﬁcant.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the eﬀects, and following the literature of these
types of competing risks models, we compute the change in the predicted probabilities of
events for the sample. Because the Yale Survey measures are derived from a Likert scale,
18Our unit of observation is a patent. In university licensing, several patents may be licensed in a
single agreement. If there are many such cases, and they reﬂect instances in which a single technology
is protected through multiple patents, our regressions would overweight these technologies. If such
technologies are systematically diﬀerent than those licensed through single patents, then this pattern
would introduce bias into our analysis. This problem is mitigated by allowing the error terms to be
correlated within each agreement. Unfortunately, we are not aware of a method to implement this
strategy and simultaneously control for unobserved heterogeneity. Because we believe that unobserved
heterogeneity is a greater problem than the overweighting of technologies represented by a single patent,
we choose to control for unobserved heterogeneity in our analyses. (It is important to note that we do
not average patent characteristics within a license because this would create a problem as large as the
one it would solve. Averaging would leave us unable to accommodate the cases in which one of the
licensed patents were either commercialized or terminated separately from the rest of the patents under
the license agreement, which we observe in a signiﬁcant number of cases. Moreover, discussions with
the director of the MIT Technology Licensing Oﬃce indicates that separate termination is a common
occurrence and is represented by several anecdotes in the ”lay” theory of technology transfer oﬃcers
about how to think about these data.)
19It is interesting to note that the unobserved components seem to be positively correlated. We ﬁnd
this result weakly in all models we estimated with unobserved heterogeneity. Interpretation of this result
depends on what we believe is unobserved. For example, if we are picking up unobserved quality, then
we would think of θ11, θ12, and θ13 as picking up high-quality patents, and θ21, θ22, θ23 as picking up
low quality patents. In this case the model predicts much lower hazards of events with high quality
patents than low quality patents.
22we look at eﬀect of a change in one standard deviation from the mean on the predicted
probability of events for the sample. Model 4c predicts both the mean probability of
termination and commercialization for the sample to be 0.12. If each manager in a line of
business associated with each of the inventions had rated the eﬀectiveness of patents one
standard deviation higher, the probability of termination for the sample patents would
decrease to 0.098, or 17.5%. Similarly, if each manager had rated secrecy one standard
deviation higher, the predicted probability of termination decreases to 0.1, or 16%.
Following our interpretation of LEARNING and LEAD TIME, we expect a high
value of LEARNING to increase πd, and a high value of LEADTIME to reduce πd.
Therefore, Propostion 1 implies that LEAD TIME is positively related to the hazard
of termination, and LEARNING is negatively related to it. We ﬁnd that, although
point estimate for LEAD TIME is positive, it is not signiﬁcant across speciﬁcations.
LEARNING is consistently negatively related to termination hazards, but we are unable
to measure this eﬀect with precision.
Proposition 2 predicts that the hazard of commercialization will increase with in-
creases in PATENT STRENGTH, PATENT SCOPE and SECRECY. While we consis-
tently measure positive coeﬃcients for each of these independent variables, only PATENT
SCOPE is measured with precision. We ﬁnd that each additional international patent
class associated with the patent increases the mean predicted probability of commercial-
ization for the sample to 0.14, which represents an increase of 16.5%. In the model, we
follow Mansﬁeld et al. (1981), who consider that greater patent scope increases imitation
costs. With this interpretation, the eﬀect of patent scope on the probability of commer-
cialization should be no diﬀerent from that of patent strength or secrecy. However,
under the alternative interpretation that patent scope increases the probability that a
proﬁtable market for the licensed technology exists, then better patent scope will cause
a shift in F m, the distribution of monopoly proﬁt outcomes. Other things constant,
a decrease in F m (a probability shift towards higher realizations) increases the hazard
of commercialization. This interpretation, which relies on mechanisms that diﬀer from
those associated with patent strength or secrecy, may explain the discrepancy in the
empirical ﬁndings for these three appropriability measures.
Since we associate the importance of LEARNING with a high πd and the importance
of LEAD TIME with a low πd, Proposition 2 predicts that LEARNING will be positively
associated with the hazard of commercialization, while LEAD TIME will be negatively
related to that hazard. We do ﬁnd that LEAD TIME is signiﬁcantly associated with a
23decrease in the hazard of commercialization. A one standard deviation change in LEAD
TIME is associated with a reduction in the commercialization probability from 0.12 to
0.09, a 21% decline.
In contrast to our ﬁnding for LEADTIME, a one standard deviation increase in the
importance of LEARNING increases the probability of commercialization by 20% (the
mean predicted probability increases from 0.12 to 0.14).20
We investigate the robustness of these results to speciﬁcation in Models b-g which
are reported in Table 4.21 In Model 4b, we remove dummy variables for STARTUP
and INDUSTRY FUNDED. The results are qualitatively similar to Model 4a, although
the coeﬃcient on LEAD TIME now has a signiﬁcant impact on termination. We see
in Model 4c that this result is sensitive to the inclusion of the INDUSTRY FUNDED
dummy, which suggests that the result in Model 4b is not due to LEAD TIME per se, but
rather the fact that high LEAD TIME inventions tend not to be INDUSTRY FUNDED.
In Models 4d, 4e and 4f, we further evaluate the sensitivity of the results by removing
class controls, age controls, and vintage controls consecutively. We ﬁnd that the our
results are robust to the exclusion of class controls in Model 4d.22 In Model 4e, we ﬁnd
that the results are robust to the exclusion of the patent age variable (which picks up
information on the remaining life of the patent). In Model 4f, year controls are omitted.
Qualitatively, the results are unchanged.23
In Model 4g, we restrict the risks to be independent, and do not allow unobserved
heterogeneity. We strongly reject the hypothesis that there is no unobserved heterogene-
ity and independent risks (LR statistic = 116.24). While the sign of each coeﬃcient does
20Moreover, as argued in Section 2.3, the eﬀect of learning would be compounded if the time to
imitation were endogenized because it would enhance duopoly proﬁts for the ﬁrst entrant (i.e., the
licensee).
21To investigate the robustness of the results with respect to method, we also ran Cox proportional
hazards models, which cannot account for competing risks. These regressions gave stronger results.
22Beyond exclusivity, we do not observe the licensing terms of the patents. It is possible that diﬀerences
in royalty terms might explain outcomes, and that royalty terms might be correlated with independent
variables of interest. Our conversations with TLO staﬀ at MIT suggest that there is not huge variation
in royalty terms across licenses, that where there is variation, it is primarily across broad patent classes.
Hence, the lack of royalty terms in our regression equations might lead to an overstatement of the eﬀects
of these controls.
23It was not possible to estimate a model with the exclusion of class, age, and year controls that also
includes a 3-point mass structure, or a cubic form for the baseline hazard due to convergence problems.
We suspect that this model is not properly identiﬁed due to insuﬃcient variation in the data (see Abbring
and van den Berg 2000).
24not change, the variables PATENT STRENGTH, LEARNING, and LEAD TIME are no
longer signiﬁcant predictors of commercialization. Compared to Model 4a, LEARNING
now negatively predicts termination, whereas STARTUP does not.24 Thus, the data sug-
gest that unobserved heterogeneity is an important characteristic of our data. Failing to
control for this obfuscates our central results.
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider that, in Model 4a we found
that the hazard of termination decreases if the technology is licensed to a STARTUP, but
the hazard of commercialization does not. By contrast, in Model 4g, we ﬁnd no eﬀect.
The sensitivity of the result for STARTUP to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
is what one might expect if start-ups not only diﬀer from well-established ﬁrms, but
also license inventions that are diﬀerent from those licensed by established ﬁrms. For
example, if startups license earlier and riskier inventions, as represented by a relatively
lower probability of success qt, but have higher discount factors δ and are more reluctant
to terminate the license (because terminating the license agreements might imply termi-
nating the startups as well), then these two eﬀects would tend to cancel out. However,
after controlling for this heterogeneity, then Model 4a shows that startup ﬁrms are more
likely than other licensees to terminate the development projects.
From our robustness analysis, we conclude that, as predicted by the theoretical model,
the hazard of termination is decreasing in PATENT STRENGTH and SECRECY. The
hazard of commercialization is decreasing in LEAD TIME, and increasing in LEARNING
and PATENT SCOPE.
6 Conclusion
We investigate the role of patents and other appropriability mechanisms in the commer-
cialization of university inventions. An important characteristic of these inventions is
that they typically require further development, which is risky for both technical and
market reasons. Thus, our theory considers the problem faced by a ﬁrm that must decide
in each period whether to invest in further development of an invention it has licensed,
or to terminate the project. If technical development is successful, the ﬁrm then decides
when to commercialize. The optimal timing of commercialization depends on a tradeoﬀ
between quick market introduction and the size of proﬁts in the ﬁrst period of sales. We
24If we interpret start-ups as having higher discount factors, then the theoretical model predicts that
start-ups will be less likely to terminate their license agreements.
25derive comparative statics results based on a variety of appropriability measures, which
provide a set of hypotheses. We test the hypotheses by applying a competing risks haz-
ard model that allows for correlated risks and non-parametric unobserved heterogeneity
to a dataset of 805 licenses of MIT patents.
Both the theoretical and empirical analysis suggest that the hazard of terminating
a license is decreasing in the eﬀectiveness of patent strength and secrecy. By contrast,
while the theory predicts that the hazard of commercialization is increasing in both
measures, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relationship.
The theoretical model also explores a somewhat counter-intuitive eﬀect that when
lead time is important, it may be optimal for ﬁrms to delay commercialization until de-
mand is favorable in order to obtain the highest possible returns in periods of monopoly
rents. Our empirical ﬁndings support this prediction. In addition, both theoretically
and empirically, patent scope and learning have a positive eﬀect on the hazard of com-
mercialization. These results suggest that, when proﬁting from these inventions relies
heavily on learning, ﬁrms should commercialize them as soon as is technically feasible.
By contrast, when lead time is important, ﬁrms may well do better by waiting for the
best opportunity to introduce a product into the market.
A few caveats are in order. First, both the theoretical and empirical analysis presume
that ﬁrms licensing these inventions intend to commercialize them. While we believe this
is a fair assumption given the laws and university policies governing university licensing,
it is possible that university attempts to prevent ﬁrms from shelving are not perfect. If
milestones or annual fees are suﬃciently low, it may be proﬁtable for ﬁrms to maintain
their licenses, preventing competitors from having access to the inventions (as would
be the case if the inventions were returned to MIT). While we cannot eliminate this
possibility, recent evidence suggests that typical university licensing contract terms are
designed to guard against this occurrence (Thursby et al. 2005).
Second, note that we have presumed that termination results when the ﬁrm decides
not to continue developing a commercial product. However, if the property rights are
weak, as we might expect in, say, electronics or mechanical engineering inventions, a
ﬁrm may maintain a license until critical, but non-protectable knowledge is transferred,
and then drop the license and invent around the invention.25 Hence, a result of a termi-
nated patent (license) is not necessarily indicative of lack of technology transfer, or of a
25Katharine Ku, head of the Stanford Oﬃce of Technology Licensing has indicated to the authors
that not only does this happen, but it is considered fair-play and not at all unethical.
26technology failure (Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2003).
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31Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Lead Time 5.369 0.506 4 6.13
Secrecy 3.923 0.406 3 4.88
Learning 5.003 0.435 4 5.75
Patent Strength 4.108 0.747 1.75 5.32
Patent Scope 1.339 0.639 1 6
Start-up 0.327 0.469 0 1
Industry Funded 0.168 0.374 0 1
Drug Patent 0.216 0.412 0 1
Chemical Patent 0.311 0.463 0 1
Electric Patent 0.265 0.441 0 1
Mechanical Patent 0.032 0.177 0 1
Other Technology 0.176 0.381 0 1
Patent Age (years since application) 2.985 3.122 0 16
Patent Age Squared 18.637 33.596 0 256
N 805
32Table 2: Termination, commercialization and right censoring by age of license
Age of License Termination Commercialization Right Censored Total
1 74 49 79 805
2 32 26 48 604
3 54 40 98 497
4 49 20 35 305
5 34 11 34 201
6 8 2 10 122
7 10 6 11 103
8 6 2 9 76
9 0 11 8 59
10 1 0 15 39
11 1 1 7 24
12 0 0 2 15
13 0 0 8 13
14 0 0 2 6
15 0 0 2 4
16 0 0 2 2
Total 269 168 370 2875
33Table 3: Termination, commercialization and right censoring by patent age
Patent Age Termination First Sale Right Censored Total
0 38 9 2 48
1 38 25 49 112
2 31 15 30 76
3 24 14 36 74
4 37 21 28 85
5 20 8 40 68
6 12 14 26 52
7 15 16 38 69
8 13 14 25 52
9 11 12 21 44
10 12 5 19 36
11 7 7 5 19
12 8 5 4 17
13 3 0 9 12
14 0 1 7 8
15 0 2 15 17
16 0 0 14 14
17 0 0 2 2
Tot 269 168 370 805
34Figure 1: Unconditional event hazards by period

















35Table 4: Hazard Regressions
Method Correlated risks with unobserved heterogeneity Independent Risks
a b c d e f g
Dependent Variable
Termi Commerc Termi Commerc Termi Commerc Termi Commerc Termi Commerc Termi Commerc Termi Commerc
nation ialization nation lizationn nation ializationn nation ialization nation ialization nation ialization nation ialization
LEAD TIME 0.099 -2.018** 1.145* -1.445* 0.793 -1.612* 0.846* -1.420** 1.067** -0.940* 0.758* -1.258** 0.859** -0.322
0.442 0.672 0.480 0.595 0.456 0.612 0.374 0.495 0.393 0.436 0.369 0.393 0.272 0.367
SECRECY -1.607** 1.431 -1.368** 1.3587 -1.271* 1.290 -1.057** 0.672 -1.030* 0.594 -0.878* 0.561 -0.913** 0.244
0.431 0.826 0.474 0.701 0.450 0.710 0.396 0.587 0.410 0.597 0.385 0.449 0.257 0.427
LEARNING 0.476 3.828** -0.628 3.331** -0.313 3.524** -0.381 3.506** -0.564 2.910** -0.132 2.414** -0.744* 0.799
0.493 1.114 0.481 0.970 0.466 1.038 0.379 0.899 0.371 0.776 0.396 0.592 0.302 0.509
PATENT -1.066** 0.859 -1.189** 0.702 -1.105** 0.652 -1.145** 0.328 -1.379** 0.341 -1.179** 0.634 -0.666** 0.515
STRENGTH 0.330 0.621 0.336 0.496 0.331 0.503 0.212 0.421 0.223 0.384 0.202 0.343 0.192 0.305
PATENT -0.238 0.718** -0.171 0.635* -0.111 0.658* -0.113 0.691** -0.132 0.564** 0.047 0.584** -0.127 0.247
SCOPE 0.209 0.252 0.196 0.261 0.196 0.253 0.183 0.208 0.189 0.181 0.169 0.175 0.129 0.137
STARTUP -1.090** 0.331 0.043 0.057
0.251 0.415 0.172 0.209
INDUSTRY -0.873** -0.435 -0.678** -0.425 -0.507* 0.335
FUNDED 0.316 0.516 0.331 0.504 0.223 0.274
DRUGS -0.153 -1.054 -0.536 -1.002 -0.359 -0.947 -0.083 -0.739
0.652 0.801 0.693 0.788 0.688 0.790 0.372 0.463
ELEC -0.240 0.462 -0.126 0.161 -0.092 0.260 -0.341 -0.089
0.402 0.645 0.370 0.579 0.361 0.607 0.231 0.314
MECH -0.377 -4.048* -0.402 -4.433* -0.245 -4.321* -0.192 -1.023
0.486 1.671 0.520 1.680 0.493 1.550 0.362 0.754
OTHER -0.421 -1.696* 0.032 -1.814* -0.194 -1.891* -0.102 -0.718*
0.420 0.686 0.418 0.661 0.409 0.671 0.258 0.332
AGE -0.258* 0.654** -0.247* 0.678** -0.251** 0.677** -0.240* 0.502** -0.289** 0.190
0.107 0.205 0.113 0.198 0.111 0.200 0.102 0.172 0.078 0.108
AGESQ 0.013* -0.035** 0.0125 -0.037** 0.012 -0.037** 0.012* -0.029** 0.017** -0.007
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
LL -976.041 -986.515 -984.428 -999.549 -1007.840 -1113.881 -1022.560
3
67 The imitator’s problem
In the main text, we take the behavior of a potential competitor as given and made
assumptions on how the entry date varies with the innovating ﬁrm’s date of ﬁrst sale.
We now show that this relationship arises endogenously in a simple model of entry
decision by an imitator. Suppose that another ﬁrm, the follower, invests in developing
a non-infringing substitute to the licensed technology as soon as the innovating ﬁrm has
commercialized in period t. Let w be a parameter representing the scope of the patent
on the licensed technology and   be the follower’s discount rate. We assume that to be
able to enter the market in period t + l, and obtain expected proﬁt of πF
t per period,
the total (discounted) cost of development to the imitating ﬁrm is given by I(l,w). For
a given w, I(l,w) decreases with l to reﬂect the fact that the sooner the entry date,
the higher the development cost (this is similar to Benoit, 1985). Also assume that
there are decreasing returns to development investment in the sense that for a given w,
MC(l,w) ≡ I(l,w) − I(l + 1,w), the marginal cost of imitating one period sooner, is
higher the shorter the lag l. Of course, following Mansﬁeld at al. (1981), this marginal




z − I(L − t,w) > 0 for every t ≤ L and that the marginal cost
of imitating one period earlier is equal to zero for periods greater than L. Hence, the
follower enters on the patent’s expiration date if it did not enter before.
In this model, in period t, total expected proﬁt from entering at date t+l is equal to
Π








where, for simplicity, we assume πF
t = πF for every t > L. Hence, proﬁt net of develop-
ment cost is equal to
Π
F(t + l) − I(l,w). (11)
Suppose that there exists an l ≥ 1 for which (11) is greater than the proﬁt from waiting
until the end of the patent’s life.26 Then, in general, for every t and l, the marginal






26Otherwise, the imitator waits until the end of the patent’s life to enter because it is not proﬁtable
to do so earlier.
37while the marginal cost from doing so is equal to
I(l,w) − I(l + 1,w).
Therefore, if the follower enters before the end of the patent’s life, the optimal entry
date, t + l∗

































The solution clearly satisﬁes l∗
t ≡ l∗, that is, the time to successful imitation is indepen-
dent of t. Hence, in this case, for a given date of ﬁrst sale by the incumbent, the optimal
entry time by the follower is given by λt = min{t + l∗,L}.
38